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Abstract 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the fourth-largest U.S. investment 
bank, sought Chapter 11 protection, initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in U.S. 
history. The demise of the 164-year old firm was a seminal event in the global financial crisis. 
Under the direction of its long-time Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld, Lehman had been 
very successful pursuing a high-leverage, high-risk business model that required it to daily 
raise billions of dollars to fund its operations. Beginning in 2006, Lehman began to invest 
aggressively in real-estate-related assets and soon had significant exposures to housing and 
subprime mortgages, just as these markets began to sour. Lehman employed a cadre of 
accountants and risk professionals to continually monitor its balance sheet, key ratios, and 
risks. It undertook desperate and questionable actions to stay alive. Nevertheless, Lehman 
ultimately failed because of an inability to finance itself. This overview case provides 
background information about Lehman’s business and key personnel and also the economic 
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environment during 2006-2008. It may be utilized individually or in connection with any of 
the other seven YPFS Lehman case studies. 
1.   Introduction 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. sought Chapter 11 protection, 
initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in United States (U.S.) history. It declared $639 
billion in assets and $613 billion in debts. At the time, Lehman was the fourth-largest U.S. 
investment bank, with 25,000 employees worldwide, a far cry from its humble beginnings in 
1844 in Montgomery, Alabama, as a dry-goods store. Despite being thought “too big to fail,” 
the federal government did not employ extraordinary measures to save Lehman, such as the 
enabling financing it had facilitated for J.P. Morgan Chase’s purchase of a failing Bear Stearns 
just six months earlier. Lehman's demise was a seminal event in the financial crisis that 
began in the U.S. subprime mortgage industry in 2007, spread to the credit markets, and then 
burned through the world’s financial markets. The crisis resulted in significant and wide 
losses to the economy. Estimates of the cost to the U.S. economy based on lost output (value 
of goods and services not produced) range from a few trillion dollars to over $10 trillion 
(GAO 2013). And this is despite the unprecedented efforts of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the 
U.S. Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the central banks of 
the world’s developed countries to intervene and stabilize their economies. 
One cause of Lehman’s demise was its significant exposure to the U.S. subprime mortgage 
and real estate markets. When these markets began to slow down, they sparked a retraction 
in the “shadow banking system” for short-term loans as concerns about unknown exposures 
to securitized subprime mortgages spread to other types of assets. Lehman, like most 
investment banks, relied on these short-term markets to raise billions of dollars each day. 
Ultimately, it was an inability to secure funding that was Lehman’s undoing. 
Other factors contributing to Lehman’s failure, which are examined in detail in the other 
YPFS Lehman case studies were: (1) a highly-leveraged, risk-taking business strategy 
supported by limited equity; (2) a culture of excessive risk-taking; (3) complicated products 
and corporate structures that spread operations and risks across borders, and (4) regulatory 
gaps that ignored the systemic risks posed by large global firms like Lehman. These and other 
issues are examined in detail in the other seven YPFS Lehman case studies. Any of the cases 
may be utilized individually or with any or all of the others. (See Footnote 1.) 
This overview module introduces participants to Lehman Brothers’ history, operations, and 
personnel, as well as the market and regulatory environment in which it found itself in 2007. 
The balance of this overview module is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a history of 
Lehman Brothers; Section 3 focuses on Lehman’s operations during 2006-2008; Section 4 
discusses actions taken and not taken by Lehman’s regulators; Section 5 identifies Lehman’s 
executive management and board of directors; Section 6 discusses the causes of the financial 
crisis; and Appendix A presents a timeline of the major events of the financial crisis.  
Questions  
1. How does management operate in a crisis, especially when choosing between options 
that are all unfavorable? 
2. What role did shadow banking play in Lehman’s collapse? 
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3. Did Lehman have appropriate corporate governance structures and internal controls 
in place? Did these structures and controls operate as intended? Were they valuable 
in affecting a corporate culture that was compliant with the letter and spirit of the 
law? 
4. What role did dissent play in the corporate context? Is it useful in influencing 
desirable outcomes? Does employee dissent present investigative opportunities for 
regulators? 
5. Given the complex structures of institutions like Lehman, were the regulators 
adequately prepared to examine and assess its overall functioning? How can 
regulators ensure that they stay current on industry developments? 
6. Were there gaps in the regulatory scheme? Have changes to the regulatory system 
adequately addressed these gaps? 
7. With the benefit of hindsight, what do you think Lehman’s management should have 
done differently?  
8. What should the government regulators have done differently? 
2.   The History of Lehman Brothers 
Lehman’s Founding and Early Years 
In the mid-1800s, Henry, Emanuel, and Mayer Lehman emigrated from Germany, to 
Montgomery, Alabama, where, in 1844, they established a small shop selling groceries to the 
local cotton farmers. Since the farmers often paid their bills in cotton, the brothers soon 
found that their business relied as much on selling cotton as dry goods. Deciding to focus on 
trading cotton, in 1858 the brothers established a New York office and were instrumental in 
setting up the New York Cotton Exchange. The brothers also began trading other 
commodities, as well as helping companies raise capital in the bond and equity markets. In 
1887, Lehman Brothers became a member of the New York Stock Exchange, establishing the 
company in securities trading and providing a foundation for the underwriting business. 
In the early 1900s, Lehman Brothers developed its banking practice by helping to 
intermediate funding for the emerging group of retail, industrial, and transportation giants 
that were founded during this period. Robert Lehman, a grandson of Emanuel Lehman, took 
over the firm in 1925 and led the company until his death in 1969. During Robert Lehman’s 
tenure, Lehman Brothers became a well-known investment bank, working with leading U.S. 
and international companies in underwriting securities offerings, providing financial advice, 
and helping in mergers and acquisitions. Lehman Brothers was organized as a partnership 
and was privately owned and family-controlled until Robert Lehman’s death; he was the last 
of the Lehman family to work at the firm.  
Acquisition by and Divestment from American Express 
After Robert Lehman’s death, the firm went through a period of drift. Then in 1973, the 
partners brought in Peter G. Peterson, a retired U.S. secretary of commerce and former chief 
executive officer (CEO) of Bell and Howell to lead the firm. Peterson had a patrician 
demeanor and a vast number of influential contacts and so was particularly favored by the 
Lehman investment bankers. Their practice relied on developing long-term relationships in 
order to secure big financings and mergers. Under Peterson’s leadership, Lehman Brothers 
flourished, becoming profitable and expanding through acquisitions. The firm also 
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established international offices and become a sophisticated global enterprise operating in 
three business segments: investment banking, capital markets, and client services.  
However, during the decade of Peterson’s leadership, the financial service industry was 
changing. First there was the “de-clienting” of the investment banking practice. As more 
companies hired their own internal financial vice presidents, they selected investment banks 
on a deal-by-deal basis, rather than on the basis of established relationships. Corporations 
sought sophisticated new products and solutions such as commercial paper and went with 
the best deal on offer. Traders—who were viewed as more rough-and-tumble than their 
investment-banker counterparts—were often the designers of these new offerings, which 
proved very profitable. In addition, due to deregulation, pension and mutual funds played a 
larger role in the stock market. Investment firms that attracted these growing funds as 
clients were able to book huge volumes of trades.  
During the recession in the early 1980s, internal conflicts broke out between the investment 
bankers and traders at Lehman. Although they generated a healthy and growing portion of 
the profits, traders had only a minority of the partnerships and received a share of the profits 
that they considered unfairly small. Lewis L. Glucksman, a 20-year Lehman veteran and 
highly successful trader with a straightforward but engaging style that some bankers 
thought unsophisticated, challenged Peterson who, in 1983, appointed him co-CEO. Given 
the opportunity, Glucksman quickly seized control, and within the year, Peterson had 
announced his retirement, and Glucksman became sole CEO. 
Glucksman, however, was not able to heal the wounds among the partners and rebuild the 
divided firm into an integrated whole. Some partners left, and profits weakened. In 1984, the 
year after Glucksman become CEO, the partners sold the firm to American Express, which 
merged the firm with its Shearson financial subsidiary to become Shearson Lehman 
Brothers. (For a more detailed narrative of Lehman under Peterson and Glucksman, see 
Auletta 1986.) 
In the 1990s, American Express decided to concentrate on its core businesses in personal 
finance and travel. In 1994, it spun off Lehman Brothers Holdings in an initial public offering, 
which capitalized the firm at $3.3 billion. Richard (Dick) Fuld, a lifelong Lehman employee, 
who had been Lehman’s CEO under American Express (and a protégé of Glucksman, sharing 
some of his character traits), became chairman and CEO of the new firm.  
Growth and Expansion 
Under the direction of Dick Fuld, Lehman expanded its portfolio of services to include the 
more risky and complex financial products that were being developed during the 2000s in 
the wake of deregulation of the financial industry. A particular keystone of this deregulation 
was the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that had prohibited affiliations between 
commercial banks and investment banks and their activities.  
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Figure 1: Lehman Brothers Holding – Market Capitalization 1994-2008 (in $billions) 
 
Source: CRSP data. 
 
Lehman aggressively pursued opportunities in proprietary trading (trading with its own 
money to make a profit for itself rather than for its clients), derivatives, securitization, asset 
management, and real estate. In 2000, proprietary trading comprised 14% of the firm’s total 
revenues. By 2006, that figure had increased to 21%. The change in business composition 
was accompanied by significant growth in revenues and an increase in market capitalization. 
(See Figure 1.) From 2000 to 2006, the firm’s revenue growth of 130% outpaced that of its 
rivals, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. During Fuld’s tenure, the firm’s revenues grew 
600%, from $2.7 billion in 1994 to $19.2 billion in 2006. Equity markets recognized this 
performance by bidding up the firm’s stock price such that its market capitalization 
appreciated by some 340% over the same period. Again, this significantly outpaced its rivals' 
growth.  
3.   Lehman in 2006-2008 
By 2006 Lehman operated in three business segments: capital markets, investment banking, 
and investment management, providing a full array of services in equity and fixed income 
sales, trading and research, investment banking, asset management, private investment 
management, and private equity. The firm was headquartered in New York and maintained 
regional headquarters in London and Tokyo, from which it conducted a complex and 
sophisticated global business (Lehman 2007, 3-14). Lehman’s operations were subject to 
regulation by a number of governmental and industry organizations in the U.S. and abroad 
including: the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), then the main U.S. regulator 
for investment banks, and the (U.K.) Financial Services Authority. (See Section 4, Regulator 
Nonaction below. Also see Wiggins et al. 2014E, which describes Lehman’s complex 
structure and the role of its regulated U.S. broker-dealer.) 
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For several years prior to 2007, the markets for securitization of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and subprime mortgages had expanded rapidly as a result of the worldwide glut of 
available funds and the high growth in the U.S. housing market. (See Section 6, Causes of the 
Financial Crises below.) Initially banks such as Lehman would buy mortgages to incorporate 
into their MBS, but as securitization became an increasingly profitable business, many of 
Wall Street’s investment banks expanded their operations to include loan origination. 
Lehman did so by acquiring BNC Mortgage and four other mortgage lenders from 2003 to 
2004. By 2007, Lehman was a leading underwriter of—and market-maker in—residential 
and commercial MBS and was active in all of the areas related to secured lending, structured 
finance, and securitized products. (In YPFS case study Wiggins and Metrick 2014H, we 
discuss securitization and the role it played in the financial crisis. For a detailed description 
of Lehman’s new strategy and securitization business, see the Examiner’s Report, Vol. 1, 
pages 58-114.) 
A New Business Strategy 
In March 2006, despite rumblings that the housing market had peaked, Lehman Brothers 
adopted a new business strategy aimed at capitalizing on its significant experience with real 
estate. (Another reason may have been that the firm had previously been successful in 
pursuing a counter-cyclical strategy in the 1980s.) Prior to 2006, Lehman would acquire 
assets primarily to “move” them to third parties through securitization, but with its new 
strategy, as it sought greater market share and profits, it acquired assets to “store” them as 
its own investments, retaining the risk and returns of those investments on its books in 
hopes of greater profits. The targeted growth areas were its proprietary businesses—
commercial real estate, leveraged loans (loans to highly leveraged, or speculative-grade, 
firms that usually offered higher returns in exchange for increased credit and liquidity risk) 
and private equity—businesses that put more capital at risk, especially if an investment 
turned sour, and which were more illiquid than Lehman’s traditional lines of business. 
The firm aggressively bought real-estate-related assets throughout 2006, and by mid-2007, 
Lehman held significant positions in commercial real estate. This made it difficult for it to 
raise cash, hedge risks, and/or sell assets to reduce leverage in its balance sheet, all critical 
to its health in a difficult financial environment (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 1, 62-3). Even 
though the U.S. housing prices began to decline in mid-2006, Lehman continued to originate 
subprime mortgages and increase its real estate holdings as other parties exited the market. 
In August 2007, Lehman announced that it would close its main subprime origination 
platform and its Korean mortgage business (BNC Mortgage). It also suspended its wholesale 
and correspondent lending activities at its Aurora Loan Services subsidiary. Yet, in October 
2007, it acquired the Archstone Real Estate Investment Trust, the largest residential REIT in 
the U.S., amid concerns from rating agencies and investors that it was overpaying for the 
deal. 
At the end of its 2007 fiscal year, Lehman Brothers held $111 billion in commercial or 
residential real-estate-related assets and securities, more than double the $52 billion that it 
held at the end of 2006, and more than four times its equity. Increasingly, rating agencies 
and investors expressed concerns regarding these types of assets due to the illiquidity of the 
market for them and to the substantial losses that other firms experienced in these 
categories. The constant revaluation by Lehman Brothers of these types of assets would 
contribute to significant write-offs throughout 2008. 
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Leverage Concerns 
One measure of a company’s capital adequacy that investors and regulators look to is 
leverage, which is the relationship of assets to equity. Lehman computed and reported this 
measure by dividing assets by stockholders’ equity. In November 2007, Lehman reported a 
leverage ratio of 30.7x (Lehman 2007, 29). This ratio had been 23.9x in 2004 (Ibid.) and had 
remained somewhat constant until 2006 when Lehman adopted a more aggressive growth 
strategy. (See Figure 2.) 
Lehman’s high-leverage, high-risk business model was similar to that of its peers. Each of the 
largest investment banks took on more leverage leading up to the crisis. This strategy 
enabled them to pursue growth and increase profits while maintaining limited capital. Figure 
3 compares Lehman’s leverage to that of its peers (using a measure of total debt divided by 
stockholders’ equity). Excessive leverage would be revealed to be one of the factors 
contributing to the financial crisis.  
Beginning in mid-2007, real estate markets began to show signs of weakening. Lehman and 
other investment banks came under greater scrutiny regarding the value of their real-estate-
related assets and their liquidity. Rating agencies and analysts began demanding that the 
investment banks reduce their leverage. To reduce leverage, firms have two choices—to 
increase equity or to sell assets. While Lehman did raise $6 billion in additional capital in 
early 2008, it preferred to sell assets.  
But this strategy proved challenging for Lehman. In January 2008, Fuld instituted a 
deleveraging strategy to reduce Lehman’s real-estate positions, but Lehman was 
unsuccessful at selling such assets at acceptable prices, given the slowing of the market. Also, 
Lehman was reluctant to sell such assets at discounted prices. Not only would doing so risk 
Lehman taking losses on the sold assets, but it would call into question the value of its 
remaining assets of similar type and compel Lehman to mark them to market value, 
potentially recognizing losses.  
 
Figure 2: Lehman’s Reported Gross Leverage Ratios, 2003-2007 
Year 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 
Leverage Ratio 
Reported* 30.7x 26.2x 24.4x 23.9x 23.7X 
*Total assets divided by stockholders’ equity. 
Source: Lehman 2007, 29. 
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Figure 3: Leverage Ratios for Major Investment Banks 
 
Leverage Ratio equals total debt divided by stockholder’s equity and is regarded as a measure 
of risk taken by a firm.  
Source: Wikicommons from Company Annual Reports. 
 
Repo 105  
As solutions failed to materialize, Lehman tried to buy time. It exceeded its internal risk 
limits and manipulated its liquidity pool—by including assets that were encumbered—and 
internal stress tests—by not including certain risky assets. (See YPFS case study Wiggins and 
Metrick 2014B for a discussion of these issues.) In addition, and significantly, Lehman 
escalated its use of a particular type of sale and repurchase (repo) transaction, known as 
“Repo 105,” to manage its balance sheet and net leverage ratio and to make them appear 
better than they were.  
As noted earlier, like most of its peers, Lehman pursued a highly leveraged business model 
that required it to raise billions of dollars in funding each day just to operate. Like most 
investment banks, it relied heavily on the unregulated short-term wholesale funding of 
commercial paper loans and repos carried by investment banks, hedge funds and other 
institutional investors—the “shadow banking system.”5 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 The shadow banking system is the name given to the network of financial institutions (“shadow banks”) that 
participate in financing activities outside of the federally regulated and insured banking system. This includes 
hedge funds, investment banks, and money funds. Whereas depository banks insure liquidity through the 
Federal Reserve System and federal deposit insurance, financial institutions in the shadow banking system 
gain liquidity by offering assets as collateral for short-term borrowings from other institutions. Shadow banks 
loan funds through a wide range of securitization and secured funding techniques such as asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP), asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and 
repurchase agreements (repos). Although no official estimate is available, the size of this market has been 
estimated to be between $10 and $16 trillion, or equal to, or in excess of, the U.S. commercial banking sector 
(Gorton and Metrick 2012, 5; Pozar, et al., 2012, 1). 
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A sale and repurchase agreement (repo) is essentially a short-term loan that is secured by 
collateral delivered to the lender by the borrower. The borrower agrees to repurchase the 
collateral when it repays the loan. Repo 105 was a type of repo in which the collateral 
delivered equaled at least 105% of the loan. Most repos are treated as "financings,” with the 
collateral remaining on the books of the borrower, but Repo 105s were treated as “sales,” 
and as a result, the borrower (Lehman) could remove from its books the collateral that it 
delivered to the lender. (See Wiggins et al. 2014C, which discusses these issues in more 
detail, and Wiggins et al. 2014D, which discusses the role of Lehman’s independent auditor.) 
Lehman significantly escalated its reliance on Repo 105 transactions during late 2007 and 
into 2008, removing as much as $50 billion dollars of assets from its balance sheet at quarter-
end, impacting its publicly reported leverage ratio. Anton Valukas, the bankruptcy examiner, 
found that these transactions had a material impact on Lehman’s financial results and should 
have been disclosed in its SEC reporting—which they were not. Dick Fuld later testified, “I 
have absolutely no recollection whatsoever of hearing anything about Repo 105 transactions 
while I was CEO of Lehman.” 
Liquidity Problems 
Lehman’s long-term assets were being funded by short-term debt (e.g., repo agreements and 
commercial paper), and Lehman borrowed billions of dollars each day in the overnight 
wholesale funding markets in order to operate. By early 2008, other institutions were less 
likely to accept Lehman securities as collateral (or, alternatively, demanded more collateral 
for a given level of financing, thereby eroding Lehman’s ability to continue to carry out its 
short-term obligations). 
Following the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, precipitated by a liquidity crisis, 
rumors circulated that Lehman would be the next bank to go under. As Lehman’s perceived 
financial position worsened, it faced a higher cost of credit. Some lenders withdrew from the 
firm, refusing to roll over its repos, others demanded bigger haircuts (discounts), and still 
others refused to accept all but a narrow type of collateral, refusing Lehman’s real-estate-
related assets and rendering them even more ineffective. For example, between June and 
August 2008, Lehman delivered an additional $9.7 billion to J.P. Morgan Chase to support its 
securities clearing and triparty services (wherein it acted as agent for Lehman’s repo 
transactions). Also, uncomfortable with the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that 
Lehman delivered, J.P. Morgan requested additional collateral, but would only accept cash.  
Other lenders made similar demands, severely restricting Lehman’s access to funding. 
Before its failure, $200 billion of Lehman’s assets were funded with secured overnight loans, 
largely repos, 80% of which came from 10 institutions. Hesitation or stricter standards by a 
small number of lenders could (and did) cause significant funding problems for the firm.  
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Figure 4: LEH Stock vs. Default Risk 
 
Source: Bespoke Investment Group. 
 
As further evidence of the market’s declining opinion of Lehman’s financial health, beginning 
in mid-2007, the spreads on its credit default swaps (contractual coverage that a party buys 
to protect itself against the possible default of a corporate or sovereign borrower, i.e., a 
market-implied, price-based measure of credit risk) began to rise (as shown in Figure 4). 
(See Examiner’s Report, Vol. 4, pages 1066-84 and 1401-81 for discussion of how Lehman 
struggled with its shrinking liquidity.) 
Searching for a Solution  
After the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman began casting around for a long-term strategy that 
would secure the firm’s future and allay the market’s fears. It considered several options, 
including increasing equity, spinning off “toxic” assets (generally real-estate-related assets) 
into a separate publicly held corporation, and discussing a sale of the firm, or a capital 
infusion, with the Korea Development Bank. Lehman was successful in raising $6 billion in 
equity in June 2008, despite a reported second quarter loss of $2.8 billion, its first since it 
went public, which was caused in part by a $3.7 billion write-down on its portfolio of 
mortgage-related assets and leveraged loans. But this was not enough to quell the rumors.  
A solution failed to materialize, and on September 10, 2008, Lehman announced that it 
expected $5.6 billion dollars in write-downs on its toxic assets and an expected loss of $3.93 
billion for its third quarter. It also announced that it planned to spin off $50 billion of its toxic 
assets into a publicly traded corporation in order to separate them from the remaining 
“healthy” firm.  
The news did not have the positive effect that Lehman desired. The rating agency Moody’s 
Investors Service announced that it planned to lower Lehman’s debt ratings if a “strategic 
transaction with a strong financial partner” did not occur soon. Even though Lehman 
continued to desperately seek such a partner, with the intercession of the U.S. Treasury and 
other government agencies as described below in Regulator Nonaction, ultimately it failed to 
secure a firm commitment within the next week. As a result, it was unable to fund its 
operations for opening on September 15, compelling it to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. (See Lehman Brothers press release dated September 10, 2008 and Lehman 
Brothers press release dated September 15, 2008.)   
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4.   Regulator Inaction  
Lehman’s operations were subject to supervision by a number of governmental and industry 
organizations, including its primary regulator, the SEC, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME), which regulated certain derivatives, the Office of Thrift Supervision, which 
supervised Lehman’s thrift subsidiary, and the New York Federal Reserve Bank (NYFED)6. 
After it filed for bankruptcy, many questions were raised about the efficacy of these agencies’ 
oversight. YPFS case studies Wiggins and Metrick 2014B and Wiggins and Metrick 2014C 
consider the actions of the regulators and many of these questions.  
Following the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the SEC and the NYFED stepped 
up their supervision of Lehman; both agencies placed employees on site and required daily 
reports. Despite reviewing daily reports regarding Lehman’s leverage and liquidity, neither 
agency took any preventive or corrective action pursuant to its authority.  
In the aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, Anton Valukas, the bankruptcy examiner, 
criticized the agencies for not taking a more active role in preventing the firm’s failure: “So 
the agencies were concerned. They gathered information. They monitored. But no agency 
regulated” (Valukas Statement, 6). He was particularly critical of the SEC, Lehman’s primary 
regulator: 
The SEC knew that Lehman was reporting sums in its reported liquidity pool that the 
SEC did not believe were in fact liquid; the SEC knew that Lehman was exceeding its 
risk control limits; and the SEC should have known that Lehman was manipulating its 
balance sheet to make its leverage appear better than it was. Yet even in the face of 
actual knowledge of critical shortcomings, and after Bear Stearns’ near collapse in 
March 2008 following a liquidity crisis, the SEC did not take decisive action.” (Ibid., 7-
8). 
(For additional information on this topic see: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 4, pages 1482-1536 for 
a thorough analysis of the government’s oversight of Lehman; US SEC, September 15, 2008 
for the agency’s response to Lehman’s bankruptcy; a later statement by Chairman Cox 
regarding the SEC’s supervision of Lehman Cox (2010); and Baxter (September 2010) 
regarding the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s response to Lehman.)  
 
The Lehman Weekend and the Bankruptcy Filing 
On the weekend of September 12-14, 2008, amid repeated pronouncements that the 
government would not bail out the firm, Timothy Geithner, president of the NYFED, 
collaborated with Henry (Hank) Paulson, U.S. treasury secretary, and Christopher Cox, 
chairman of the SEC, to host a meeting of the CEOs of the major Wall Street investment banks 
to hammer out a private sector solution for Lehman, which ideally would not involve any 
government or central bank funding.7 The idea was similar to the 1998 private industry 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 Although the NYFED did not regulate Lehman, Lehman was a primary dealer required to bid at Treasury 
auctions and trade directly with the NYFED. The NYFED was also potentially a lender to Lehman and 
reviewed the bank in that capacity. 
7 In attendance at the emergency meeting called by the NYFED were: John, Mack, CEO, Morgan Stanley; John 
Thain, CEO of Merrill Lynch; Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase; Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs 
Group; Vikram Pandit, CEO of Citigroup Inc.; Robert Wolf, CEO of UBS, and representatives from the Royal 
Bank of Scotland Group PLC and Bank of New York Mellon Corp., among others. 
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solution reached to save the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, after its main fund, 
Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P. collapsed.8   
Despite interest from Bank of America and Barclays plc, the discussions at the NYFED failed 
in part because of the government’s refusal to assist with funding Lehman’s toxic assets.9 
And in the case of Barclays, the potential deal was subject to a shareholder vote, which could 
not be secured in the available time, and which U.K. authorities declined to waive.10 
After failure of the emergency meeting, Lehman realized that it would not be able to raise 
enough funds to open for business the next day; there just were not enough banks willing to 
lend it sufficient funds against the assets that it could offer. The Lehman board of directors 
voted to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, which was done on September 15, 2008. 
By so doing, Lehman was granted an opportunity to have certain parts of its operations 
dismantled in an orderly fashion overseen by a bankruptcy court. However, large blocks of 
its business, such as its estimated 900,000 derivatives contracts, were not subject to 
bankruptcy supervision. Counterparty efforts to protect themselves resulted in fire sales 
amounting to the loss of billions of dollars. (See YPFS case studies McNamara and Metrick 
2014F and Wiggins and Metrick 2014G for more discussion on this point.) 
In the Examiner’s Report, Anton Valukas found that there existed colorable claims against 
several Lehman officers for filing misleading financial reports.11 (See Section 5, Lehman 
Personnel.) However, on May 24, 2012, it was reported that the SEC would close the Lehman 
file without pursuing action against the firm or any of its former officers (Gallu 2012). Mary 
Shapiro, the new SEC chairperson, did not confirm the reports. As of early 2014, no 
government agency has brought any case against any former Lehman officer or director. The 
bankruptcy case remains ongoing. (See Gallu 2012 regarding the SEC closing its Lehman 
case, and see Larson 2014 regarding the bankruptcy case.) 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Russian Financial Crisis in early 1998, LTCM’s main 
fund lost $4.6 billion in less than four months during 1998. Concerned about the fund’s failure causing a chain 
reaction and spreading to others, the NYFED worked with the heads of the major Wall Street firms to find a 
solution. Meeting at the NYFED’s offices, on September 23, 1998, fourteen investment and commercial banks 
(notably excluding Bear Stearns) reached an agreement for a $3.65 billion recapitalization of LTCM. Even so, 
the fund liquidated and dissolved in early 2000. 
9 Bank of America considered buying Lehman but terminated acquisition talks. The government’s willingness 
to take responsibility for Bear Stearns’ most troubled assets led some parties to believe that the government 
would act in a like manner with respect to Lehman. The U.S. government’s refusal to assist with Lehman’s 
most troubled assets led Bank of America to pull out of the talks. The next day, Bank of America announced 
that it would acquire a different investment bank, Merrill Lynch. See Examiner’s Report, Vol. 4, 1516-39 for a 
description of the Lehman weekend. 
10 Barclays plc pulled out of talks to buy Lehman because of the U.S. government’s refusal to guarantee future 
losses on Lehman’s trading positions. (It was also speculated that Barclays used the threat of withdrawal as a 
negotiating tactic.) A consortium of other investment banks, however, did agree to take up to $40 billion in 
Lehman’s toxic assets to help the deal along, but to no avail. Barclays needed a shareholder vote to approve 
the deal, a requirement for U.K. publicly listed firms. The only exception was if the U.K. authorities waived the 
shareholder vote, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused to do, killing the deal. Nevertheless, on 
September 20, 2008, just days after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, Barclays acquired most of Lehman’s U.S. 
assets for $1.35 billion, a deal that the bankruptcy court judge approved only reluctantly. 
11 Valukas also found that similar claims existed against Lehman’s independent audit firm, Ernst &Young, 
which is discussed in YPFS case study Wiggins, et al. 2014 D. 
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5.   Lehman Personnel 
Key Executive Officers 
Lehman’s long-time CEO Dick Fuld was the embodiment of the classic American Horatio 
Alger story and had become firmly cemented in his role as the face of Lehman Brothers. 
However, CEOs do not run companies by themselves, nor do they make decisions in a 
vacuum. Lehman employed thousands of experienced, well-educated professionals to 
oversee the firm’s vast operations. Fuld’s cadre of executives was at the helm of the fourth-
largest investment bank in the country; they were extremely bright and confident people 
who had weathered many storms and steered the firm through many successful years. 
However, Lehman’s size and complexity meant that Lehman’s executives were only subject 
to certain details firsthand and relied on subordinates and systems to ensure the firm’s 
smooth operation and compliance with applicable laws and policies.  
• Richard “Dick” S. Fuld, Jr. (Chairman of the Board & Chief Executive Officer) began 
his career at Lehman as an intern in 1966 and rose through the ranks as the firm's 
focus shifted from traditional investment banking to sales and trading in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. He was one of the few Wall Street CEOs to rise from the 
trading side of the business. (He was also a protégé of CEO Lewis Glucksman, 
Lehman’s first CEO with a trading, rather than investment banking, background.) 
Fuld became CEO in 1994, and during his tenure Lehman aggressively pursued 
opportunities in proprietary trading, derivatives, securitization, asset 
management, and real estate. Fuld led the firm through several previous near 
collapses, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and it was difficult to separate 
the firm’s identity from his own. The peak value of Fuld’s Lehman stock before the 
firm's collapse had been approximately $1 billion. That stock's value had fallen to 
$56,000 by the time of the firm’s bankruptcy. In 2007, Fuld was quoted as saying: 
“As long as I am alive, this firm will never be sold.” He appointed Bart McDade as 
balance sheet czar in January 2008 and later ousted long-time friend and 
colleague Joe Gregory (replaced by McDade) and Erin Callan (replaced by Ian 
Lowitt), following fallout from the second quarter earnings call in June 2008. 
• Joseph “Joe” M. Gregory (President & Chief Operating Officer) started at Lehman in 
1974 in the same trading division as Dick Fuld. He was a long-time, trusted 
confidant to Fuld and served as president and chief operating officer (COO) of 
Lehman from 2004 to June of 2008. Joe Gregory resigned in order to communicate 
to the markets that Lehman was instituting management changes in response to 
its $2.8 billion loss in the second quarter of 2008. 
• Herbert “Bart” H. McDade (President and Chief Operating Officer) started at 
Lehman in 1983 as a trader and steadily assumed positions of greater 
responsibility. By 2000 he was co-head of the Global Fixed Income division and a 
member of the firm's operating committee. He then headed the Fixed Income and 
Equities divisions. In early 2008, he was appointed balance sheet czar by Dick Fuld 
to lead the firm’s deleveraging efforts. In June of 2008, he replaced Joe Gregory as 
president and COO and led several of the efforts to find capital for the firm, 
heading negotiations with prospective purchasers and investors. He conceived 
the “good bank/bad bank” contingency plan that contemplated isolating Lehman’s 
toxic assets in a separate publicly traded company.  
• Erin M. Callan (Chief Financial Officer) was Lehman’s much-celebrated chief 
financial officer (CFO) during the first half of 2008. She began her career as a tax 
lawyer with the firm of Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett and accelerated through the 
ranks at Lehman to become CFO at age 41. Joe Gregory was her mentor within the 
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firm. She lost popularity when she was suspected of being the source of a June 
2008 leak to the Wall Street Journal about Lehman’s quest to find a capital 
infusion. Amid the static from the leak, Callan offered to resign as a token symbol 
to the markets and left the firm. She was replaced by Ian Lowitt. 
• Ian T. Lowitt. (Chief Financial Officer) joined Lehman in 1994 from McKinsey & 
Company and became the co-chief administrative officer, where he was 
responsible for the global oversight of several corporate units, including, finance, 
productivity and process improvement, risk management, and technology. Bart 
McDade promoted him to CFO after McDade was appointed president in 2008.  
• Madelyn Antoncic (Former Chief Risk Officer) joined Lehman Brothers in 1999 
from Barclays Capital, where she was head of Market Risk Management and 
treasurer for the Americas. She had previously worked at Goldman Sachs and the 
NYFED. In 2002 she became chief risk officer responsible for firm-wide market, 
credit, and operational risk and helped build Lehman’s risk-management 
infrastructure into a world-class operation. In 2007 she was named Bank Risk 
Manager of the Year by Risk Magazine. Beginning in 2006, as Lehman loosened its 
risk limits in support of a new growth strategy, Antoncic resisted, and in 
September 2007, she took on the new role of global head of financial market policy 
relations, being replaced as CRO by Christopher O’Meara.  
• Christopher M. O'Meara (Chief Risk Officer) joined Lehman in 1994 and held 
various positions in the Finance Division until he was promoted to financial 
controller in 2001. A year later, he became the firm’s global controller. In 
December 2004, he was promoted to chief financial officer of the firm and served 
in that position until September 2007, when he was replaced by Erin Callan as 
CFO. He in turn, replaced Madelyn Antoncic as chief risk officer.  
• Matthew Lee (SVP, Finance) was a 14-year veteran of Lehman, responsible for 
balancing the company’s global balance sheet for public reporting. He became 
concerned about a number of alleged accounting irregularities, and in May 2008, 
sent a letter to Lehman’s senior management alerting them to these, including 
concern over Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. The next month his 
employment was terminated.  
The bankruptcy examiner analyzed the fiduciary duties that Lehman’s management owed to 
the firm and their actions and found that colorable claims did not exist with respect to its 
handling of the level of risk that Lehman had assumed and its liquidity issues. (Examiner’s 
Report, Vol. 1, 52). The examiner did, however, find that colorable claims existed against 
Lehman officers Dick Fuld, Christopher O’Meara, Erin Callan, and Ian Lowitt for decisions 
regarding the use of Repo 105 and for filing misleading financial statements that did not 
disclose such usage (Ibid., Vol. 3, 990-1027).  
Lehman’s Board of Directors 
When Thomas Cruikshank, one of Lehman’s former board members and chairman of its audit 
committee at the time of its demise, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Committee, he described a competent and involved body of advisors: 
“Board meetings were an active and dynamic affair. Board members probed management, 
asked numerous questions and demanded and received detailed, cogent answers” 
(Cruikshank, 3). However, many questions have been raised regarding the role that the 
Lehman board of directors played in the firm’s demise. How active and engaged were the 
directors? Was the board composed of the right people, given Lehman’s growth and its 
expansion into more sophisticated and complex businesses and products? Most directors did 
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not have financial services or banking backgrounds. Of those who did, their experience was 
not recent. Did management intentionally keep the board in the dark about certain of 
Lehman’s key weaknesses?  
As of September 14, 2008, when the decision to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
was approved, the firm had 10 non-executive members on its board of directors. (Dick Fuld 
had been a director since 1990 and was elected its chairman in 1994.) As described in 
Lehman’s 2008 Proxy Statement, the non-executive members of the Lehman Board of 
Directors are listed below. 
• Michael L. Ainslie, Private Investor and former President and CEO of Sotheby’s 
Holdings. Director since 1996. Age: 64. 
• John F. Akers, Retired Chairman of International Business Machines Corporation. 
Director since 1996. Age: 74.  
• Roger S. Berlind, Theatrical Producer and Private Investor, principal of Berlind 
Productions. Director since 1985. Age: 77.  
• Thomas H. Cruikshank, Retired Chairman and CEO of Halliburton Company. Mr. 
Cruikshank was also the former Chief Financial Officer of Halliburton and is an 
accountant and a lawyer. Director since 1996. Age: 76. Chairman of the Audit 
Committee since 2003. The Board of Directors had determined that Mr. Cruikshank 
was an "audit committee financial expert" as defined under SEC rules. 
• Marsha Johnson Evans, Retired Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy and former President and CEO 
of the American Red Cross. Director since 2004. Age: 60.  
• Sir Christopher Gent, Non-Executive Chairman of GlaxoSmithKline plc. and former 
CEO of mobile-phone company Vodafone plc. Director since 2003. Age: 59.  
• Jerry A. Grundhofer, Chairman Emeritus and Retired CEO of U.S. Bancorp. Director 
since 2008. Age: 63.  
• Roland A. Hernandez, Retired Chairman and CEO of Telemundo Group, Inc. Director 
since 2005. Age: 50.  
• Henry Kaufman, President of Henry Kaufman & Company, Inc., an investment 
management and economic and financial consulting firm. Previously, Mr. Kaufman 
was the chief economist at Salomon Brothers. Director since 1995. Age: 80. Chairman 
of the Risk Committee since 2003. 
• John D. Macomber, Principal of JDM Investment Group. Previously Mr. Macomber was 
a McKinsey & Co. consultant and CEO of chemical-maker Celanese Corporation. 
Director since 1994. Age: 80.  
The Board met eight times in each of 2006 and 2007 (and in 2007, acted by unanimous 
consent twice).  
The Lehman Finance and Risk Committee was composed of Kaufman (Chairman), Berlind, 
Evans, Hernandez, and Akers. The committee “reviews and advises the Board of Directors on 
the financial policies and practices of the Company, including risk management” (Lehman 
2008, 11). The Committee held two meetings in each of 2006 and 2007.  
The Lehman Audit Committee was composed of Cruikshank (Chairman), Ainslie, Berlind, and 
Gent. “The Audit Committee assist[ed] the Board of Directors in fulfilling its oversight of the 
quality and integrity of the Company's financial statements and the Company's compliance 
with legal and regulatory requirements” (Ibid., 9). The Committee was also responsible for 
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retaining the independent registered public accounting firm, which was Ernst & Young. The 
committee met seven times during 2006 and 11 times during 2007. The Audit Committee 
also met separately with Ernst & Young without management present so that the 
independent auditors might “speak freely.” 
Lehman’s board and committee composition, and the number of meetings held, was not 
unusual in the industry. Anton Valukas, the bankruptcy examiner did not find that actionable 
claims existed against the Board.  
 (For more information concerning the board, see Statement of Thomas Cruikshank before 
the House of Representatives Financial Services Committee. See the Examiner’s Report (Vol. 
1,188-202) for a discussion of the Board’s duty to the firm and an analysis regarding 
Lehman’s risk-taking activities. See the Examiner’s Report (Vol. 3, 945-8 and 991-2) for 
discussion of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions. Also, Larcker and Tayan 2010 provide 
a comparison of the Lehman Board to that of Goldman Sachs.)  
 
6.   Causes of the Financial Crisis 
During much of the late 1990s and into the early 2000s many emerging-markets and 
commodity-rich countries experienced large current account surpluses and sought safe 
assets to invest in, traditionally sovereign and government agency debt. At the same time, 
there was significant growth in institutional cash pools, such as pensions, money market 
funds, and hedge funds, which also demanded these safe assets. As demand for these safe 
assets outstripped supply, a global savings glut resulted. 
During the same period, booming U.S. housing prices and low interest rates combined to 
create an exuberant mortgage market. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), whereby 
investors purchased the right to a stream of payments fueled by a pool of underlying 
mortgages, became very popular. As U.S. housing and mortgages had traditionally been 
considered stable investments, and because at this time mostly lower-risk “prime” 
mortgages were used, many of these MBS received high investment-grade ratings. Prior to 
2003, the market in MBS had been dominated by the government-sponsored entities, the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and also enjoyed an implied governmental guarantee.  
In response to the savings glut, banks became more involved in producing MBS. As demand 
continued, banks combined MBS with other types of asset-backed securities (ABS), such as 
those based on credit card receivables, auto loans and student loans, to sell them as a new 
type of bond-like security called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Payments under the 
CDOs were to be made out of the flow of repayment from the underlying MBS and ABS 
making up the CDO. Again, because of the mortgages underlying the CDOs, many received 
investment-grade ratings.  
CDOs proved very popular and were aggressively sold to investors in all the world’s major 
markets. By 2007, CDOs had become a significant portion of the ABS market. To meet the 
demand for MBS and CDOs, banks began pooling not just prime mortgages but also riskier 
subprime loans and a greater portion of the securities underlying CDOs became MBS, and 
then subprime MBS. Over time, lenders loosened underwriting standards in order to 
increase the quantity of subprime mortgages that could be pooled. As they became common, 
CDOs and other structured debt were routinely used as collateral for repo transactions.  
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CDOs were termed structured instruments because they were divided into different tranches 
based on the timing of payments and the payment priority given the holder of a particular 
tranche (higher-rated tranches were guaranteed payment before lower-rated tranches). 
Creating tranches allowed investors to choose at what level of risk to invest and allowed 
investment firms to create investment-grade tranches from even sub-prime mortgages. 
Lehman’s troubles were due in part to the fact that it retained some of the low-rated tranches 
of the CDOs it generated, and these tranches were the first to get into trouble when the 
housing market cooled. 
2007 Shocks and Contagion  
When the housing boom began to stall in 2006, a number of CDOs and MBS based on 
subprime mortgages were downgraded. This sent a tremor of panic through the market 
because there was great uncertainty about the identity of the owners of the affected 
securities and the amount of their exposure. As a consequence, firms began to withdraw from 
their accounts and horde their cash. These concerns soon began to impact other classes of 
structured instruments. The credit markets began to seize, led by a dramatic decline in sales 
of commercial paper. 
As the markets became unsure of the underlying value of ABSs, firms with exposures to ABSs 
found that their lenders demanded greater discounts (haircuts), restricted the types of 
collateral they would accept, or even refused to rollover their repos. Borrowers such as 
Lehman saw their liquidity needs and costs rapidly increase. In response, they sold assets to 
raise cash for collateral as lenders’ requests escalated and then to fund redemptions as 
clients pulled back from the firms. The result was that high-quality assets were often sold at 
fire-sale prices, further aggravating an overall depressed and anxious market.  
Both greater haircuts for repo lending and fire-sale pricing of assets squeezed Lehman’s 
liquidity to a point that it was unable to fund itself, resulting in its bankruptcy on September 
15, 2008. This shock to the already weakened global financial markets led to a widespread 
and unprecedented liquidity crisis that would eventually require the central banks of the 
world’s major financial markets to take unprecedented actions to prevent total collapse.  
(In YPFS case study Wiggins and Metrick 2014 H, we consider in detail how the subprime 
mortgage crisis and liquidity crisis led to Lehman’s demise and the impact of its filing on the 
world’s economies. In addition, see Gorton 2010  for further insight on how a U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis turned into a global financial crisis.) 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Financial Crisis Major Events 
2006 
June U.S. housing prices peak and start to decline.  
2007 
Jan.–July   Massive downgrades of mortgage‐backed securities by rating agencies. 
January 2 
Top 20 subprime mortgage underwriter Ownit Mortgage Solutions files 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, claiming assets less than $10 
million and debts owed of $170 million.  
February 27 Freddie Mac announces that it will no longer buy the most risky subprime 
mortgages and mortgage-related securities. 
April 2 New Century Financial Corporation, the second largest subprime 
mortgage lender, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
June 7 
Bear Stearns informs investors that it is suspending redemptions from its 
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, which 
had invested heavily in subprime mortgage–backed securities. 
A group formed by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), a German 
government‐owned development bank and several commercial banks, 
bail out German bank IKB, whose Rhinebridge structured vehicle suffered 
heavy losses from the downturn in subprime mortgages.  
August 
Problems in mortgage and credit markets spill over into interbank 
markets; haircuts on repo collateral rise; asset‐backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) issuers have trouble rolling over their outstanding paper. 
Outstanding U.S. ABCP drops almost $200 billion. 
August 9 BNP Paribas, Frances largest bank, halts redemptions on three investment 
funds.  
August 10 The Federal Reserve adds $38 billion in reserves and issues a statement 
reaffirming its commitment to provide liquidity. 
August 16 
Fitch Ratings downgrades Countrywide Financial, the country’s largest 
subprime lender, to BBB+, its third lowest investment-grade rating, and 
Countrywide borrows the entire $11.5 billion available in its credit lines 
with other banks. 
August 17 Run on Countrywide Financial.  
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September 9 Run on U.K. bank Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest 
mortgage lender. 
September 14 The Chancellor of the Exchequer authorizes the Bank of England to 
provide liquidity support for Northern Rock.  
December National Bureau of Economic Research subsequently declares 
December to be the business cycle peak.  
December 12 The Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) that will auction term funds to depository institutions. 
December 15 Citibank announces it will take its seven structured investment vehicles 
(with a value of $49 billion) onto its balance sheet.  
2008 
January 11 Bank of America announces that it will purchase Countrywide Financial in an all-stock transaction worth approximately $4 billion.  
February 17 The Treasury of the United Kingdom takes Northern Rock into state ownership. 
March 11 
The Federal Open Markets Committee increases its swap lines with the 
European Central Bank by $10 billion and the Swiss National Bank by $2 
billion and also extends these lines through September 30, 2008. 
Federal Reserve announces creation of the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) to promote liquidity. 
March 16 
JP Morgan Chase announces that it will purchase Bear Stearns for $2 per 
share, less than 7% of its market value just two days prior, with $30 billion 
in assistance from the NYFED. 
March 17 
The Federal Reserve Board establishes the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF), extending credit to primary dealers at the primary credit rate 
against a broad range of investment grade securities.  
July 13 The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the NYFED to lend to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, if necessary. 
July 30 
U.S. Congress passes the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that 
was designed to address the subprime mortgage crisis. It established the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and was intended to restore 
confidence in the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) but 
ultimately led to the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
August 6 
American Home Mortgage Investment Corporation, once the tenth largest 
(nonsubprime) mortgage lender, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. 
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September 7 The Federal government places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship.  
September 10 
Lehman Brothers preannounces expected $5.6 billion of write-downs on 
toxic mortgages and an expected loss of $3.93 billion for its third quarter. 
Moody’s threatens to lower Lehman’s debt ratings if a “strategic 
transaction with a strong financial partner” does not occur. Lehman’s 
stock drops 40% to $4.22, down a total of 90% from its November 2007 
value of $67.73. 
September 
12-14 
The CEOs of the major Wall Street investment banks meet at the NYFED to 
try and reach a solution to save Lehman. The U.S. Treasury and Federal 
Reserve refuse to provide financial guarantees for a Lehman transaction. 
Despite interest, Bank of America and Barclays fail to close a deal.  
September 15 
Lehman Brothers announces that it will file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection. 
Bank of America announces that it is in talks to purchase Merrill Lynch for 
$38.25 billion in stock. The final agreement reflects that Merrill Lynch was 
sold for about US $50 billion or $29 per share, a 70.1% premium over its 
September 12 closing price or a 38% premium over its book value of $21 
a share.  
The Fed doubles the TSLF size to $200 billion and widens the asset set 
eligible as collateral for Treasury loans.  
A group of banks including Citigroup and J.P. Morgan set up a $70 billion 
fund to increase liquidity.  
The European Banking Community injects €30 billion, and the Bank of 
England injects £5 billion into their respective economies. 
The Dow Jones falls 504.49 points (4.4%), its worst percentage decline 
since reopening after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
London’s FTSE 100 Index closes down 291.80 points (3.9%).  
September 16 
The Federal Reserve bails out AIG, acquiring a 79.9% equity stake for $85 
billion to keep it solvent. Eventually the government would hold 92% and 
invest a total of $152 billion.  
The Reserve Primary Fund, a money market fund (MMF), “breaks the 
buck,” causing a run on MMFs.  
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September 17   
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announces a temporary 
emergency ban on short selling in the stocks of all companies in the 
financial sector.  
The Dow Jones falls 449.36 points (4.0%).  
The FTSE 100 Index closes down 221.10 points (2.25%).  
Russia suspends trading on its stock market for two days after the worst 
market fall since the country’s 1998 financial collapse, and the Finance 
Ministry pledges a total of $60 billion of funds to help local banks. 
September 18 
The Federal Reserve coordinates with the Bank of England, the European 
Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank to inject an 
additional $184 billion into the world’s banking systems to compensate 
for the lack of active lending.  
September 19 
News of the “bad bank” bailout plan and short-selling ban helps world 
stock markets soar. The Dow Jones climbs 387.97 points (3.39%). FTSE 
100 closes up 431.3 points (8.80%). 
The U.S. Treasury announces a temporary guarantee of MMFs, and the 
Federal Reserve announces the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Funds Liquidity Facility. 
September 25 The authorities seize Washington Mutual, the largest savings and loan in the U.S., with $300 billion in assets. 
September 28 The FDIC announces assistance for the Wachovia merger with Wells Fargo, and the Federal Reserve increases the size of the TAF. 
September 29 
The U.S. House of Representatives fails to pass the Bush Administration's 
$700 billion bailout plan, triggering the biggest one-day point drop in the 
history of the Dow Jones, 778 points (7.0%). The FTSE 100 also drops 
418.80 points (5.30%). 
The U.K. nationalizes mortgage lender Bradford and Bingley.  
Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourgian governments bail out the Belgium-
Dutch bank Fortis. 
Iceland takes control of the country’s third largest bank, Glitnir. 
September 30 
Iceland guarantees all bank deposits for two years in an effort to stabilize 
its banks.  
French, Belgian, and Luxembourgian governments bail out Belgian bank 
Dexia.  
October 3 
U.S. Congress approves the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
authorizing expenditures of $700 billion. 
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The Dow Jones closes down 582.94 points (1.50%). The FTSE 100 gains 
171.80 points (2.26%) 
October 7 
Control of two of Iceland’s three largest privately owned banks, 
Landsbanki and Glitnir, is handed over to receivers appointed by the 
Financial Supervisory Authority. 
Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility (CPFF) to provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of 
commercial paper.  
October 8 
Central banks in the U.S., England, China, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the European Central Bank cut interest rates in a coordinated effort to 
aid the world’s economies. 
October 13 
Major central banks announce unlimited provision of liquidity to U.S. 
dollar funds; European governments announce system‐wide bank 
recapitalization plans. 
October 14 
The U.S. Treasury invests $250 billion in nine major banks. 
FDIC announces the creation of the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program (TLGP). 
November 23 Federal Reserve, Treasury and FCI agree to provide Citigroup a package of guarantees, liquidity access, and capital. 
November 25 Federal Reserve announces the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) to support the issuance of Asset Backed Securities (ABS). 
2009 
January 16  
The U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and FDIC announce a 
package of guarantees, liquidity access, and capital for Bank of America 
totaling $118 billion.  
February 17 
President Obama signs into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, which includes a variety of spending measures and tax cuts 
intended to promote economic recovery.  
May 
Results of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (“bank stress 
tests”) are announced. Many banks are required to announce additional 
capital. 
June The National Bureau of Economic Research subsequently declares June to be the business cycle trough. 
October U.S. unemployment rate peaks at 10.0 percent.  
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Gorton and Metrick (2012). 
62
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 1 Iss. 1
